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RULE 11 AND RULE REVISION
Margaret L. Sanner* and Carl Tobias**
Numerous observers of modem civil practice, whose views
range across a comparatively broad spectrum, consider the 1983
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 the most
controversial revision since the United States Supreme Court
promulgated the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.1
Counsel and litigants overused and abused the 1983 modification to
Rule 11 by inappropriately stressing the compensatory goal of the
proviso and improperly deemphasizing the stricture's deterrence
objective. Many judges vigorously enforced Rule 11, often finding
violations and imposing burdensome sanctions which frequently
included large attorney's fees. This activity of lawyers and parties,
as well as courts' implementation, was responsible for considerable
unnecessary and expensive litigation that was unrelated to the
substantive merits of disputes. The overuse, abuse and judicial
application of the 1983 change had detrimental consequences for
individuals and groups with relatively little time, money or power,
such as those who pursue civil rights actions.
* Partner, Goodman, Allen & Filetti, P.L.L.C., Richmond, Virginia.
** Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to
thank Sherry Churchill and Pam Smith for processing as well as Russell
Williams for generous, continuing support. I was a member of the Civil
Justice Reform Act Advisory Group of the United States District Court for the
District of Montana and of the Study Committee to Review the Nevada Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, the views expressed here and errors that remain
are ours.
1. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930-31
(1989); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 207
(1988); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1993) (adding new
language intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions),
reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 167 (1983). See generally Carl Tobias, Reconsidering
Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855 (1992) (reviewing and analyzing the
controversy surrounding the 1983 amendment, and offering suggestions for the
future).
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These complications prompted the federal rule revision entities,
such as the Judicial Conference of the United States Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee), to formulate
and propose significant amendments to the 1983 revision of Federal
Rule 11. The Supreme Court accepted the recommendation tendered
by the Judicial Conference, the courts' policymaking arm, and by its
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing
Committee) that the 1983 version be substantially amended and,
thus, instituted a revision that became effective during 1993.
Notwithstanding the unusually expeditious attempt to rectify or
temper the difficulties created by the 1983 modification-a purpose
which the 1993 alteration has seemingly realized-the experience
with the 1983 amendment may have undermined confidence in the
rule revision process of judges, counsel and litigants.
Two critical examples illustrate this phenomenon. One is the
increasing willingness of the ninety-four United States District
Courts to prescribe and apply local practice requirements that depart
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Another is the growing
amenability of the fifty states to promulgate and enforce strictures
regulating civil practice within their jurisdictions which deviate from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
All of the propositions recounted above mean that the 1983
amendment to Rule 11, the version's deployment by attorneys and
litigants, the revision's effectuation by courts, and its modification
warrant scrutiny on the twentieth anniversary of the 1983 revision.
The article undertakes that effort. This article first descriptively
traces the background of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11. Part I
emphasizes the difficulties accompanying the revision's invocation
by lawyers and litigants, as well as judicial implementation, which
made the proviso the most disputed alteration over the civil rules'
five-decade history, and which eventually led to its fundamental
reform. The article then surveys efforts to modify the controversial
1983 amendment only ten years after the Supreme Court prescribed
it. The article next attempts to derive lessons from the experience
with the 1983 version. The article concludes by offering numerous
recommendations, a majority of which implicate the federal rule
revision process.
RULE 11 AND RULE REVISION
I. THE 1983 AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE 11
The origins and development of the 1983 amendment to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, its employment by counsel and parties,
and the judicial application of the stricture have received much
analysis elsewhere.2 Nevertheless, a brief overview will enhance
understanding of the 1983 modification, why that revision became so
controversial, and how it was ultimately altered a decade thereafter.
A. Amendment of the Original Federal Rule 11
The United States Supreme Court promulgated the 1983
amendment as a major constituent of an integrated set of revisions.
The High Court and the amendment entities meant to increase
attorneys' responsibilities in, and judicial control over, civil
litigation, especially during the pretrial phase. 3  The 1983
amendment required lawyers and litigants to conduct reasonable
prefiling factual and legal inquiries, while certifying that their papers
were factually well grounded and legally warranted. The 1983
revision to Rule 11 also mandated that judges levy sanctions on
counsel and parties who did not discharge these responsibilities.
4
B. The 1983 Amendment's Invocation and Implementation
Throughout the initial half-decade after the Supreme Court
prescribed the 1983 amendment, judges differed on many questions
which were central to the revision's effectuation. They
2. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11,
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943, 946-49 (1992); Tobias, supra note 1, at 855, 858-64;
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 478-92 (1991). The initial 1938 rule, which fell into
disuse because attorneys rarely invoked it and judges were reluctant to impose
sanctions, had not been amended before 1983. See generally D. Michael
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems
With Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976)
(canvassing Rule I l's history before 1975).
3. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984); Carl Tobias, Public Law
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270,
291-92 (1989).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1993), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at
167-68.
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inconsistently interpreted and applied the nascent version.5 Rule
1 's 1983 amendment promoted much costly, unwarranted satellite
litigation which implicated its phrasing as well as the type and
magnitude of sanctions. 6  During this five-year period, Rule 11
motions were filed and sanctions were imposed against civil rights
plaintiffs more frequently than any other classification of civil
litigants.7 Many courts vigorously applied the revision or levied
substantial sanctions against parties that did not comply with Rule
11. 8  Numerous civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys possess
comparatively few resources, making them risk averse. Certain
judges, lawyers, and legal scholars asserted that judicial
implementation of the 1983 version had chilling effects on these
litigants and attorneys.9
5. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 1, at 1930; Vairo, supra note 1, at 207.
See generally Tobias, supra note 1 (reviewing and analyzing the controversy
surrounding the 1983 amendment, and offering suggestions for the future).
6. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d
Cir. 1987) (involving satellite litigation over the sanction imposed), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see also Burbank, supra note 1, at 1930-31; Carl
Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 514 (1988-
89). Compare Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987)
(holding that no continuing duty exists to comply with Rule 11 on individual
papers after the initial filing), with Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1386-
87 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (finding the existence of a continuing duty), affd sub
nom., Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 544-46 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. denied sub nom., Chambers v. United States Dep't of Army, 499
U.S. 959 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule
]1-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327, 1340 (1986); Vairo, supra note 1, at
200-01.
8. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th
Cir. 1987) (providing an illustration of vigorous judicial enforcement);
Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985)
(providing another example of vigorous judicial enforcement); Avirgan v.
Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (imposing a $1,000,000 sanction on a
plaintiff), af'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11 th Cir. 1991).
9. See Nelken, supra note 7, at 1327, 1340; Tobias, supra note 6, at 495-
98, 503-06; Vairo, supra note 1, at 200-01; cf Advisory Comm. on the Civil
Rules, Judicial Conference of the US., Call for Written Comments on Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules, as Amended in
1983, 131 F.R.D. 344, 347 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments] (finding
considerable disagreement over whether the 1983 amendment in Federal Rule
11 had actually chilled the enthusiasm of civil rights plaintiffs).
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Considerable difficulty in applying Rule 11 resulted from
courts' uncertainty about the principal objective of the 1983
amendment. The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 1983
revision suggested that its major purpose was to deter litigation
abuse. 10 Nonetheless, a 1985 study of the amendment's early
implementation undertaken by the research arm for the federal
courts, known as the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), indicated that
the revision's goals were to punish offenders, to compensate those
injured by Rule 11 violations, and to deter future litigation abuse."
When judges who effectuated the alteration did not focus on
deterrence and made attorney's fees the sanction of choice,' 2 this
application granted lawyers and parties economic incentives to file
Rule 11 motions and prompted them to consider the revision a fee-
shifting device.13
These phenomena concomitantly triggered a dramatic increase
in Rule 11 activity, encouraging the rise and growth of a new form of
civil litigation. Federal appellate and district court judges published
approximately 700 Rule 11 decisions in the first three and one-half
years after the 1983 amendment 14 and issued hundreds of additional
unpublished opinions.' 5 Indeed, the federal courts published over
3000 reported Rule 11 determinations by the conclusion of 1990.16
Much of the early commentary that implicated the revised
version was comparatively favorable. For instance, Professor Arthur
R. Miller, who was the Advisory Committee reporter, wrote a
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment,
reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
11. See SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS
(1985); see also 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1994) (authorizing the Federal Judicial
Center as the research arm of the federal courts and prescribing the entity's
duties).
12. See ELIZABETH WIGGINS ET AL., RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES § lB, at 9 (1991) [hereinafter FJC REPORT]; Nelken, supra
note 7, at 1333.
13. See Vairo, supra note 2, at 479-80. But cf Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 409 (1990) (stating that "Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting
statute....").
14. See Vairo, supra note 1, at 199.
15. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 485-86; Tobias, supra note 3, at 301.
16. See Vairo, supra note 2, at 480 (citing NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N.
COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (Nov.
1990)).
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Federal Judicial Center report that generally praised the 1983
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule
11.17 Judge William W Schwarzer of the Northern District of
California also penned a 1984 article which lauded the Rule 11
modification and requested that federal courts enforce it rigorously.18
Indeed, numerous appellate and district court judges employed
and cited this work when authoring Rule 11 opinions in the half-
decade after the 1983 revision.19 However, a few observers did
criticize the modification. For example, Professor Stephen Burbank
questioned whether the Supreme Court possessed the requisite
authority to implement the 1983 amendment,20 while Professor
Edward Cavanagh wondered how the revision would function in
practice.2'
The problems with the 1983 amendment did not become clear
immediately, and judges and academicians only began suggesting
ways to treat the problems after several years of experience with the
proviso. Professor Melissa Nelken published an influential 1986
paper asserting that judges significantly and incorrectly
overemphasized the 1983 revision's compensatory goal and notion of
attorney-fee shiffing as an appropriate sanction. Nelken believed that
the new version was disadvantageous and chilled civil rights
plaintiffs' enthusiasm for litigation.
22
Professor Georgene Vairo wrote an important 1988 article in
which she tendered claims analogous to Nelken's.23 That same year,
Judge Schwarzer also voiced concerns about satellite litigation and
17. See MILLER, supra note 3.
18. William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985); see also infra note 24 and accompanying
text.
19. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121,
125 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J., dissenting); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780
F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986); Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 512, 519 (W.D.
Mich. 1987); Holley v. Guifflida, 112 F.R.D. 172, 174 (D.D.C. 1986).
20. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 997 (1983).
21. See Edward D. Cavanaugh, Developing Standards Under Amended
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFsTRA L. REv. 499
(1986).
22. See Nelken, supra note 7.
23. See Vairo, supra note 1.
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the amendment's use for purposes of reimbursement. 24 During late
1988, the Federal Judicial Center finished a Rule 11 study which
accepted some of these ideas, such as the enormous reliance on the
provision, and rejected others, such as the assertion that the revision
discouraged civil rights plaintiffs from vigorously pursuing their
actions.2 5  In 1989, the Third Circuit Task Force on Rule 11
published a report observing that courts were inconsistently applying
the stricture, that Rule 11 was fostering litigation unrelated to
disputes' merits, and that judicial enforcement could detrimentally
affect resource-poor litigants.
26
Ironically, near the time when criticism of the proviso's
implementation first developed and was growing, federal appeals and
district courts improved how they effectuated the 1983 amendment.
For instance, numerous judges began interpreting and applying Rule
11 in a more uniform way, while the amount of satellite litigation
generated by the revision declined.27
Notwithstanding this apparently improved effectuation realized
by the federal appellate and district courts, the Advisory Committee
began considering the prospect of altering Rule lI's 1983 version six
years after its promulgation.25 The next section of this article
24. See William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013
(1988); see also Tobias, supra note 6 (responding to Judge Schwarzer's
article); Schwarzer, supra note 18 (affording Judge Schwarzer's earlier Rule
11 article).
25. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., THE RULE 11
SANCTIONING PROCESS 67-81, 157-68 (1988); see also KASSIN, supra note 11
(affording earlier FJC study); WIGGINS ET AL., supra note 12 (affording later
FJC study).
26. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF
THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11,
at 13-24, 60-61, 68-72 (1989); see also Burbank, supra note 1.
27. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL.
L. REV. 105, 110-22 (1991); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions,
Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting Misapplication of Rule 11 By
Harmonizing It With Pre-Verdict Dismissal Devices, 60 FORDHAM L. REV.
257,266-67 (1991) (finding decrease in satellite litigation).
28. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 854 (1991).
The Advisory Committee is a twelve-member entity comprising judges, law
professors, and attorneys, which Congress has authorized to study the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and to formulate proposals for change as warranted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994); see also Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive
History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85
Winter 2004]
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canvasses the measure's amendment and emphasizes those sources
which evince the rule revisers' intent.
II. THE 1993 RULE AMENDMENT PROCESS
Many developments, especially numerous propositions traced in
the article's first segment, apparently coalesced during 1989 and may
have persuaded the Advisory Committee to evaluate a possible
amendment to the 1983 Rule 11 modification. Federal District Court
29Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. stated that "[tlhe Committee had
received various requests, formal and informal, for further
amendment or abrogation of [the 1983 version] of Rule 11" and "was
aware of several studies of the rule undertaken by various
individuals, bar associations, and courts," but the members were not
certain whether the group should propose alterations and, if so, what
their exact nature should be.
30
In 1989, the Advisory Committee decided to consider revisions
to the 1983 version. It resolved to commission another Federal
Judicial Center Rule 11 evaluation. 31 District Judge John Grady,
who was then serving as Advisory Committee Chair, appointed three
people to plan this empirical assessment.32
During 1991, the FJC finished its compilation and preliminary
review of data implicating Federal Rule 11 premised on
computerized docket information that the Federal Judicial Center had
MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1509-11 (1987) (reviewing congressional involvement in
the federal civil rulemaking process); Mullenix, supra, at 797 n.2 (describing
the composition of the Advisory Committee and providing citations to other
useful authority); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 464-69 (1993) (reviewing the
history and powers of the Advisory Committee).
29. Pointer, who was the Advisory Committee's chair from early 1991 until
mid-1993, served as chair over almost the whole period when the 1993
revision of Rule 11 transpired.
30. See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Attachment B to Letter to Hon. Robert E.
Keeton, chairman, Standing Committee, from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr.,
chairman, Advisory Committee 2-5 (May 1, 1992)), reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
519, 522-25 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 POINTER LETTER].
31. See Mullenix, supra note 28, at 854; Tobias, supra note 1, at 861-62.
32. District Judge John Grady appointed the following three people:
Professor Paul Carrington, the Advisory Committee reporter; Magistrate Judge
Wayne Brazil of the Northem District of California; and Thomas Willging,
Deputy Research Director of the Federal Judicial Center.
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gathered from five representative federal district courts and
responses to questionnaires which the Judicial Center had circulated
to all federal district judges.33 The data gleaned from the five courts
indicated that, on average, judges were no more likely to find civil
rights plaintiffs in violation than litigants who filed other types of
cases that prompted substantial Rule 11 activity.34 However, courts
did impose attorney's fees as the sanction of choice. 35 Two principal
themes emerged from the judicial survey responses. Eighty percent
of respondents believed that Rule 11 had a positive impact on civil
litigation, that the advantages derived warranted the time spent on
judicial implementation, and that the 1983 alteration should be
retained.36
A similar number of judges thought that baseless lawsuits were a
minor concern and that expeditious rulings on motions to dismiss and
for summary judgment, pretrial conferences conducted under Federal
Rule 16, and informal warnings were more effective. 37 Half of those
jurists who responded believed that "Rule 11 exacerbate[d]
contentious behavior between counsel.
' 38
In the summer of 1990, the mounting criticism that judges,
attorneys, parties and scholars leveled at Rule Il 's 1983 alteration
seemingly persuaded the Advisory Committee to announce publicly
that it was reconsidering Rule 11.39 The Committee issued a Call for
Comments which asked for written responses to ten questions about
how the proviso was actually operating.40 These included whether
33. See ELIZABETH WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., RULE 11:
JUDGES SURVEY AND FIELD STUDY PRELIMINARY REPORTS (1991). Because
the FJC made no changes relevant to this article in compiling its final report,
cited supra at note 12, I rely on the preliminary report in this part. See Tobias,
supra note 1, at 864.
34. See FJC REPORT, supra note 12, § 1C, at 1-8.
35. Seeid. § 1B, at9.
36. See id. § lA, at 1.
37. See id. § 1A, at 1-2.
38. Id. § IA, at 2. These are the survey results most relevant to the issues
treated in this Article, although the FJC Report includes much additional
information.
39. See CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 9, at 344; see also Mullenix,
supra note 28, at 854; Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93.
40. CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 9, at 345. The controversial nature
of the proposal to amend the 1983 revision of Rule 11 prompted the Advisory
Committee to invert the ordinary sequence of soliciting public comment after
developing a proposal.
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the 1983 amendment had encouraged counsel to "stop and think"4I
before they filed papers, whether the benefits of that conduct
outweighed the expenses in terms of satellite litigation, and whether
Rule 11 had "been administered unfairly to any particular group of
lawyers or parties.
' 2
Some 125 individuals and groups responded, and a significant
percentage of them criticized the 1983 modification as well as its
invocation by attorneys and clients and judicial effectuation.43 The
principal assertions were that the version fostered excessive and
costly litigation unrelated to the merits, that judges inconsistently
applied Rule 11, that the measure's implementation detrimentally
and disproportionately affected civil rights plaintiffs and their
counsel, and that the Rule promoted incivility among lawyers.
44
The Committee also invited sixteen experts to give their
viewpoints at a February 1991 public hearing. These witnesses'
testimony resembled the responses to the Call for Comments. For
instance, they spoke about the expensive satellite litigation which
Rule 11 frequently generated and the measure's deleterious impact
on civil rights plaintiffs.45
After the public hearing, the Advisory Committee informally
agreed to revise the 1983 proviso and acknowledged that the
widespread criticism of the amendment had merit even though it was
frequently exaggerated or premised on flawed assumptions. 46 The
Advisory Committee also thought the 1983 version's goal-to
demand that litigants stop and think before filing papers-remained
appropriate and should be maintained, while the evolving precedent
41. See id, at 346-47.
42. See id.
43. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 862-63; Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93.
The public responses are on file at the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts in Washington, D.C.
44. See id,
45. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 863; Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93.
46. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence
(Attachment to Letter to Hon. Robert E. Keeton, chairman, Standing
Committee, from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr., chairman, Advisory Committee
(June 13, 1991), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 64 (1991) [hereinafter 1991
POINTER LETrER]; 1992 POINTER LETTER, supra note 30.
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had resolved many difficulties which Rule 11 had created earlier.
47
However, the Committee did find substantiation for five integral
propositions:
(1) Rule 11, in conjunction with other rules, has tended to
impact plaintiffs more frequently and severely than
defendants;
(2) it occasionally has created problems for a party which
seeks to assert novel legal contentions or which needs
discovery from other persons to determine if the party's
belief about the facts can be supported with evidence;
(3) it has too rarely been enforced through nonmonetary
sanctions, with cost-shifting having become the normative
sanction;
(4) it provides little incentive, and perhaps a disincentive,
for a party to abandon positions after determining they are
no longer supportable in fact or law; and
(5) it sometimes has produced unfortunate conflicts
between attorney and client, and exacerbated contentious
behavior between counsel.48
Once the Advisory Committee reached these determinations and
informally concluded that Rule 11 should again be revised, Judge
Pointer and Professor Carrington assumed substantial responsibility
to develop and craft the proposed modifications for the Advisory
Committee's consideration at its May 1991 meeting.49 They drafted
a proposal meant to enhance the Rule's fairness and effectiveness in
deterring counsel and litigants from proffering and maintaining
frivolous positions while simultaneously limiting the stricture's use.
The preliminary draft revision of Rule 11 that the Advisory
Committee assembled at its May 1991 meeting deserves somewhat
limited treatment in this article.50 Moreover, various entities in the
47. See 1991 POINTER LETTER, supra note 46, at 64-65; see also 1992
POINTER LETTER, supra note 30, at 523 ("In addition, although the great
majority of Rule 11 motions have not been granted, the time spent by litigants
and the courts in dealing with such motions has not been insignificant.")
48. See id.
49. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 863-64.
50. The developments which occurred in the day-long session throughout
which the Committee reviewed Rule lI 's change and the document that
Winter 2004]
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rule revision hierarchy later changed certain significant aspects of the
preliminary draft. However, this article evaluates the important
features, particularly the alterations that have greatest relevance to
the 1993 amendment, showing their final resolution, when indicated.
One central modification prescribed by the Advisory Committee
implicated representations tendered to the court by lawyers or
parties. The Advisory Committee imposed a continuing duty on both
represented and unrepresented litigants to withdraw allegations that
subsequent research or pretrial discovery showed were
unsupported.51
The Advisory Committee described as "well-taken" criticism
that this proposal "might lead to disruptive and wasteful activities
based on a mere failure to re-read and amend previously filed
[papers]. 52  The Committee responded by making "several
modifications to the published language of the text," which
essentially imposed the duty only on anyone "who 'pursues' a
previously filed paper."
53
A significant change in the 1993 amendment of Rule 11 related
to the legal certification's sufficiency. That change required counsel
and unrepresented litigants to offer papers warranted by a
nonfrivolous (rather than a good faith) "argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
law.",54 One important difficulty with this alteration was that the
"good faith" phraseology had acquired certain meaning among
judges, attorneys and parties. Lawyers and litigants could thus easily
satisfy the "good faith" standard, while judges enforced the stricture
felicitously.
55
members fashioned have received assessment elsewhere. See Tobias, supra
note 1, at 865-93; Vairo, supra note 2, at 495-500.
51. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137
F.R.D. 53, 75 (proposed August 1991) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
52. 1992 POINTER LETTER, supra note 30, at 523.
53. Seeid.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(2), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 420-21. The 1993
amendment, like the 1983 version, initially mandates that papers be warranted
by existing law. See id.; FED R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1983), reprinted in 97
F.R.D. at 167-68 (1983).
55. Several Advisory Committee members voiced these concerns during the
1991 meeting. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 871 n.90.
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The amended Rule 11 correspondingly requires attorneys who
represent plaintiffs as well as pro se plaintiffs to certify that any
"allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery." 56 Defendants' lawyers and pro se defendants must
similarly certify that all "denials of factual contentions are warranted
on the evidence, or if specifically so identified, are reasonably based
on a lack of information or belief.,
57
When changing the proviso in the 1983 amendment, the rule
revision entities required signers to certify that papers were "well
grounded in fact," and expressly admitted that litigants might have
plausible reasons to think such facts were true or false, yet needed
discovery to assemble and confirm evidentiary support.58  The
Advisory Committee Note observed that the modifications were a
specific attempt to equalize the burden of the rule upon plaintiffs and
defendants as well as to impose a "duty of candor.'"
59
The 1993 revision in Rule 11 also significantly changed the
1983 amendment's mandate that judges levy an appropriate sanction
to include monetary assessments, namely attorney's fees, when they
find Rule 11 violations.6° Perhaps the most important change was
leaving the decision of whether to sanction within the trial court's
discretion, as it had been before the 1983 revision.
The 1993 revision also included numerous particular sanctioning
procedures, in contrast to the 1983 modification, which offered
virtually no specific guidance.6 1  Some of the most significant
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (b)(3), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421 (1993).
57. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(4), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421 (1993).
58. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1983
amendment, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68 (1983); FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee's note to the 1993 amendment, reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
583, 585 (1993).
59. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1993
amendment, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 586 (1993); see also PRELIMINARY
DRAFT, supra note 51, at 76 (examples of subsections that attempt to equalize
the amendment's burdens).
60. I rely in this paragraph on FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1983), reprinted
in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68; FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (amended 1993), reprinted in 146
F.R.D. at 421-23.
61. For additional explanation of these procedures, see Carl Tobias, The
1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 206-09 (1994).
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requirements inserted in the 1993 alteration mandated that: parties
file Rule 11 motions independent of other papers; litigants receive
notice and an opportunity to respond; judges explicate their
sanctioning decisions; "safe harbors" be provided; and courts
exercise their discretion to sanction.
62
A final substantial change to the 1983 amendments related to
the sanctions that judges levied when they found that counsel or
parties had violated Rule 11.63 The amendment seemed to have four
critical objectives which involved sanctioning: to emphasize that
courts might assess non-financial sanctions; to deter litigation abuse;
to discourage reliance on monetary awards, in particular attorney's
fees; and to reduce judicial enforcement of Rule 11 for compensatory
objectives.
64
After Judge Pointer and Professor Carrington reduced the
propositions agreed upon by the Advisory Committee in the May
1991 session to writing, they circulated the document to the entity's
members for approval and transmitted a final version to the Standing
Committee the following month.65 The Standing Committee assessed
the draft and incorporated minor changes in the proposal during July
1991.66 The Standing Committee then issued the suggested revision,
solicited public comment and held two public hearings.
6 7
Once the Advisory Committee examined every written comment
proffered and each oral submission tendered, the group substantially
changed the draft in April 1992 and submitted that new proposal to
68the Standing Committee. In June of that same year, the Standing
Committee inserted numerous alterations. One major change left
62. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1993
amendment, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583.
63. I rely in this paragraph on Tobias, supra note 1, at 880-90.
64. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1993
amendment, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583.
65. See 1991 Pointer Letter, supra note 46, at 1, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63,
63 (1991); see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 898 (discussing the procedures for
the amendment to become effective).
66. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 51, at 74-82; see also Tobias,
supra note 1, at 898 (observing that the standing committee made some
modifications in July).
67. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 51, at 53, 56.
68. See 1992 POINTER LETTER, supra note 30, at 1; see also Randall
Sambom, Key Panel Votes Shift in Rule 11, NAT'L L. J., July 6, 1992, at 13.
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sanction decisionmaking to the courts' discretion.69 In September
1992, the Judicial Conference endorsed this recommendation without
further alterations and forwarded it to the Supreme Court.7°
The Supreme Court evaluated the proposed revision to Rule 11
as one important constituent in an ambitious set of rule amendments
proffered by the Standing Committee during autumn 1992. The
Justices transmitted the suggested Rule 11 alterations unchanged to
Congress on April 22, 1993. 7' Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by
Justice Clarence Thomas, authored a vociferous dissent to the High
Court's submission of the Rule 11 revision.72 Justice Scalia thought
that the proposed amendment would "eliminate a significant and
necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation," because it granted courts
discretion in sanctions determinations, disfavored compensatory
assessments, and prescribed a safe harbor.73
Although senators and representatives frequently deferred to the
other entities in the rule revision hierarchy, Congress had exhibited
substantially greater willingness since 1980 to intercept proposed
federal rule amendments that covered evidence as well as criminal,
civil, and appellate procedures.74 Some House members opposed the
69. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 46 (July 1992) [hereinafter
PROPOSED AMENDMENT]; Samborn, supra note 68, at 13 (discussing the
change which left sanctions decisionmaking to the courts' discretion).
70. See Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of
Rule 11, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1778 (1992). The Supreme Court was
required to approve and transmit the amendment to Congress before May 1,
1993, for the revision to take effect in 1993. See id; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074
(2001) (establishing time parameters for approval by the Supreme Court);
Judicial Conference of the U.S., Amendment of Procedures for the Conduct of
Business by the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 134 F.R.D. 315, 317 (1991) (explaining the time parameters and
process for submitting changes to the rules).
71. See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 403
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 AMENDMENTS].
72. See id, at 507-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 507-08; see also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
74. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1018-20 (1982); see also Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the
1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 961
(1991) (discussing Congress's deference to other authorities for rule revision);
Tobias, supra note 3, at 293, 337-40 (discussing willingness of Congress to
remain involved with rulemaking). See generally Jack H. Friedenthal, The
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1993 Rule 11 amendment tendered by the Supreme Court. However,
the alteration took effect on December 1, 1993 because Congress
passed no amendatory legislation.75
III. LESSONS
Numerous significant lessons, mainly implicating the federal
rule revision process, can be gleaned from the experiences detailed in
the previous sections of this article. One important lesson learned
from the 1983 amendment is that premising modification on
anecdotal information, rather than empirical data systematically
gathered, analyzed and synthesized by experts, can have unintended
and often detrimental consequences for udges, lawyers and parties
as well as the rule revision process. For example, the 1983
amendment was an integral feature of a package the High Court
meant to enlarge attorneys' duties and judicial control by requiring
sanctions imposition for rule violations (namely deficient prefiling
inquiries).
77
Moreover, the rule revisers apparently did not learn from this
experience because they grounded the 1993 change in Rule 26 on
limited empirical data. Rule 26 imposed mandatory pre-discovery or
automatic disclosure. This disclosure requirement provoked even
greater controversy than the 1983 amendment of Federal Rule 11.78
Rulemaking Poiver of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 673, 673-77 (1975) (discussing judicial power and roles in rule reform).
75. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. For information that
documents the various congressional machinations, see H.R. 2814, 103d Cong.
(1993); Tobias, supra note 61, at 188; New Discovery Rules Take Effect,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3, 40.
76. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 1, at 1927-28; Mullenix, supra note 28,
at 813-20. See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study
in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1567 (1991); Laurens Walker,
Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments,
51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67.
77. Virtually no empirical data showed that meritless cases were a grave
problem or that sanctioning was the best way to address frivolous litigation.
See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1927-28; supra notes 3-4 and accompanying
text.
78. Indeed, Justice Scalia found it "most imprudent to embrace such a
radical alteration that has not.., been subjected to any significant testing on a
local level." See 1993 AMENDMENTS, supra note 71, at 511 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Accord Mullenix, supra note 28, at 813-20; Carl Tobias, In
Defense of Experimentation with Automatic Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REv. 665,
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Perhaps the most valuable lesson that implicates the questions
treated here is that overly frequent revision in substantial numbers of
rules complicates practice and undermines respect for the
amendment process. For instance, when the revisers make
numerous, frequent alterations to strictures, judges may have
difficulty interpreting and applying them, while lawyers and parties
must spend time and money finding, understanding and satisfying
these changes.
The disadvantages imposed by rule modification's quickened
pace and the numerous amendments witnessed in the 1983 and 1993
revisions were exacerbated by a pair of interrelated actions. During
1990, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act (the "CJRA").
The statute requested that all ninety-four districts experiment with
local cost and delay reduction techniques. 79 Three years later, the
Supreme Court authorized those districts to eschew or change
important 1993 federal rules amendments in deference to this
testing.80
The problems fostered by the speed and quantity of revisions at
the national and district court levels actually encouraged scholars to
urge a moratorium on federal civil rule amendment. 8 Despite their
importuning, the rule revisers modified the discovery provisos seven
years after the 1993 amendments.8 2 That modification was the fourth
667 (1993); see also Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in
Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1 (1992) (analyzing the
proposed revision imposing automatic disclosure).
79. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-78 (1994). For analysis of the CJRA, see Lauren
Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN.
L. REv. 1447 (1994); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial
Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589 (1994).
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a) (amended 1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
431, 437; see also Donna Stienstra, Implementation of Disclosure in United
States District Courts with Specific Attention To Courts' Responses to Selected
Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 182 F.R.D. 304 (1998)
(affording empirical data related to the federal district courts that rejected or
modified the federal discovery amendments).
81. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform:
A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 841 (1993); John B. Oakley, An
Open Letter on Reforming the Process of Revising the Federal Rules, 55
MONT. L. REv. 435 (1994).
82. See, e.g., John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal
Flaws, 84 MNINN. L. REV. 505, 513-20 (2000); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving
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revision in two decades, causing some observers to question the need
for and wisdom of the 2000 changes.8 3 In short, the rule amendment
entities not only ignored the admonitions directed at the rate and
number of modifications, but also compounded the situation by
prescribing more revisions with even greater alacrity. These
developments, alone and synergistically, may have discredited the
federal amendment process. They have at least eroded confidence in
the federal amendment process, although those notions resist
definitive proof.84
Two phenomena strongly indicate that participants in modem civil
practice and rule revision believe that the national process has
undergone a loss of stature, if not credibility. One is the tendency
among the ninety-four federal districts to promulgate and enforce
measures governing local practice that conflict with or reiterate the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.85 This development received
substantial impetus from the CJRA, encouraging the courts to
prescribe and apply disuniform local strictures, and 1993 federal rule
amendments which specifically empowered districts to reject or
modify applicable federal discovery rules. 86 Despite commands in
the 1985 and 1995 revisions of Federal Rule 83 and in the 1988
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act (requesting that the
district courts scrutinize and eliminate or alter conflicting or
the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52
SMU L. REv. 229, 233-36 (1999).
83. See id.
84. For example, it is difficult to identify cause-effect linkages and to
isolate all relevant variables, such as local legal culture, a phenomenon which
itself may partly explain the developments. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, A
New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929,
944-49 (1996); Robel, supra note 79, at 1484. Several observers have
expressly proffered the contentions asserted in the text. See, e.g., Mullenix,
supra note 28, at 855-57; sources cited supra note 81.
85. See, e.g., Walter W. Heiser, A Critical Review of the Local Rules of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 555, 557-64 (1996); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local
Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2011-26 (1989); Carl Tobias, Local
Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 533 (2002).
86. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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duplicative local provisos), 87  numerous tribunals have not
implemented these mandates.88 Some have even continued to adopt
and enforce new inconsistent or redundant local strictures.
Therefore, district unwillingness or reluctance to follow the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure evinces decreasing confidence in the
national amendment process. Indeed, observers attribute those
phenomena to belief by local judges, lawyers and parties that the
federal rule revisers "got it wrong" or that districts can fashion
superior rules.
90
A second indicium is the fifty states' growing willingness to
deviate from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a model. A
1986 nationwide assessment revealed that many jurisdictions based
all or most essential features of their state civil rules (such as
discovery) on federal analogues soon after 1938.91 However,
jurisdictions with larger populations often did not invoke the national
rules template.92 Although the attorneys and law professors who
drafted the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure hoped these
requirements might serve as a paradigm that jurisdictions would
emulate, thus fostering uniform intrastate civil practice,93 since the
87. See FED. R. CIv. P. 83 (amended 1995); FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (amended
1985); 28 U.S.C. §§ 332 (d)(4), 2071 (1994).
88. See Tobias, supra note 85, at 556-68; see also Heiser, supra note 85, at
557-64.
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State
Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 359 (2003); Robel, supra note 79, at 1484; see also
Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil
Procedure, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992). One respected federal district court
judge has astutely remarked: "[A]s a trial judge myself perhaps I will be
forgiven for stating the point bluntly-nationally uniform rules protect...
against the tyranny of any unduly willful renegades among us trial judges."
Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with
Uniformity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 860 (1989).
91. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State
Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1367, 1427 (1986).
92. See id.
93. See Subrin, supra note 85, at 2011-19; Tobias, supra note 85, at 536-
39; see also Oaldey, supra note 90, at 354-56, 384.
96. See id.
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1980s, state reliance on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a
model has actually declined.96
In 2003, Professor John Oakley undertook a similar evaluation
and ascertained that virtually no jurisdictions premised all their civil
rules on the federal counterparts. 97 Professor Oakley also intimated
that state departures could well expand over time.98  More
specifically and quite relevant to this article, Oakley found only one-
third of the jurisdictions (which he determined substantially
complied with the national paradigm during 1986) had adopted the
1993 revision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, even though
eighty-five percent of the jurisdictions had previously instituted the
1983 version.99 Oakley also suggested that decreasing respect for the
national amendment process explained the phenomenon, and he
voiced "confiden[ce] that the era of federal procedural hegemony
ha[d] ended."' 00
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The above considerations, especially the lessons denominated in
Part III, prompt the articulation of several recommendations for the
future. The major purpose of these recommendations is to restore
and bolster the apparently flagging confidence in national rule
revision at the federal district court level and in the procedural
systems of the fifty states by improving the national amendment
process itself or, at least, by responding to its most detrimental
aspects.
97. See Oakley, supra note 90, at 355, 383-84; see also Carl Tobias, The
Past and Future of the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEv. L.J. 400, 404-05
(2003) (suggesting ways to remedy inconsistency between federal and state
civil procedure).
98. See id.
99. A mere ten percent of the fifty jurisdictions subscribed to the 1993
federal revision of Rule 26 that imposed automatic disclosure. See Oakley,
supra note 90, at 382-83, 386.
100. See id. at 383; see also Oakley, supra note 81 (discussing the need to
reform the federal rule revision process).
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A. The Federal System
1. The Rule Revisers
The federal rule revisers must seriously consider whether the
frequency and number of amendments since the 1983 revision of
Rule 11 were warranted (i.e., particularly by empirical data
demonstrating a grave complication that necessitated treatment
which an amendment would remedy). The prior analysis found that
the rate and quantity of modifications with insufficient empirical
justification have been detrimental and perhaps undermined a few
changes' efficacy. For instance, the majority of the 1983 revisions
expanded lawyers' duties and judicial control, partly through the
imposition of sanctions for Rule 11 violations. However, minimal
empirical data showed there was a troubling difficulty that Rule 11
would address.' 0' Even though virtually no empirical data justified
the nationwide application of this unconventional technique, the rule
revisers broadly amended Rule 11 a decade later, when the 1983
amendment became controversial, as one feature of another
substantial package that imposed mandatory disclosure. 10 2 The rule
revisers promulgated a third large set of amendments only seven
years thereafter, mainly addressing discovery provisions, with little
empirical data indicating that the discovery regime experienced
serious problems, or that the proposed modifications would treat any
difficulties which the system imposed. 0 3 Therefore, the rule revisers
101. See supra note 76.
102. The Advisory Committee did rely on experimentation with automatic
disclosure by three federal districts, although this testing may have been
insufficient to support the rather dramatic change instituted. See supra note 78
and accompanying text.
103. The Advisory Committee did commission the Federal Judicial Center
and the RAND Institute for Civil Justice to perform discovery studies, which
the Committee employed when deciding whether it should propose additional
change in the discovery strictures. The Committee members relied in part on
these evaluations' findings to prescribe the 2000 discovery amendments. See
James S. Kakalik et al., Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Discovery
Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation
Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical
Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525 (1998). The Committee's dependence on
the studies and the revisions has been somewhat controversial. For example,
the studies found discovery problematic in few, mainly complex, cases, but the
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should prescribe amendments less often and institute fewer of them,
while guaranteeing that valid empirical data underlie the changes.
For example, the revisers might limit future alterations to situations
in which experts thoroughly collect, assess, and synthesize empirical
data that demonstrate a severe complication requiring treatment,
which a federal rule modification can solve or temper without
harmful side effects.
The revisers may want to implement some of this article's
recommendations by adopting a withdrawn 1991 proposed change in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83.1°4 This model represents a
balanced approach that would facilitate district experimentation with
promising local measures which depart from the federal rules
because it authorizes courts to test these procedures when districts
secure Judicial Conference approval.'05  If the experimentation
showed that particular mechanisms functioned well, the revisers
could then suggest national amendments with greater confidence
about how the devices operated in practice.
2. The Federal District Courts
There are several changes which the ninety-four federal district
courts might institute to enhance the national rule revision process.
Most importantly, the districts should refrain from prescribing new
local strictures that conflict with or repeat, and abrogate or modify
the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1°6 This would help to
restore and foster more confidence in national amendments while
enlarging respect for the federal rules as a national procedure code.
The action would simplify, and perhaps decrease the cost of and
amendments apply to substantially more lawsuits. See sources cited supra note
76.
104. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 51, at 153. See generally Walker,
supra note 76 (suggesting that the failure to collect valid information before
implementing rule amendments is the chief deficiency in federal rules
development).
105. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 51, at 153. See generally Levin,
supra note 76, at 1576 (discussing the 1991 proposal and how mechanisms for
challenging local rules when they are inconsistent with federal rules have
rarely been invoked); Tobias, supra note 79, at 1633-34 (arguing that future
experimentation should follow the 1991 proposal to amend Federal Rule 83).
106. For sources that impose these duties on the federal districts and on
Circuit Judicial Councils, the policymaking arms of the appeals courts, see
supra note 87.
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reduce delay in, local federal practice. Hence, these changes would
limit the requirements that judges must interpret and apply and that
lawyers and parties must find, comprehend, and satisfy.
Should the national rule revisers adopt the rescinded 1991
proposed alteration of Federal Rule 83, the trial courts might devise
and suggest innovative experiments with measures that would
facilitate national and local practice. 0 7 If the amendment entities do
not subscribe to the withdrawn 1991 concept, districts should
assemble and evaluate relevant material on difficulties with federal
rules and local techniques as well as their potential solutions and
should forward this information to the rule revisers for consideration
in the national amendment process.
3. Miscellaneous Suggestions
Fundamental to the initiatives assessed will be continuing, and
perhaps expanding, dependence on the Federal Judicial Center and
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(Administrative Office).10 8  The federal judiciary's research and
administrative arms can provide valuable expertise and assistance to
the rule revisers and the district courts. For example, the Federal
Judicial Center and the Administrative Office now possess or have
access to considerable informative material. 10 9 They might collect,
review and synthesize additional instructive empirical data that could
support national rule amendment. 1 0 The entities may also help
districts conform their local measures to federal analogues or
structure proposals for experimentation under the withdrawn 1991
recommended change to Rule 83, should this promising mechanism
be implemented.11'
107. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (providing authorization for
the Federal Judicial Center and the entity's duties); 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 et
seq. (1994) (authorizing the Administrative Office as the administrative arm of
the federal courts and prescribing the entity's duties).
109. Illustrative is material regarding experimentation under the 1990 Civil
Justice Reform Act and with automatic disclosure. See supra notes 79, 86, 100
and accompanying text.
110. Illustrative are the Federal Judicial Center's collection of empirical data
which supported Rule I I's 1993 revision and the discovery provisions' 2000
amendment. See supra notes 25, 31-37, 78, 101 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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B. The States
Numerous propositions afforded in this article that implicate the
federal regime apply with equal force or by analogy to the states.
Most importantly, the fifty jurisdictions must seriously reconsider
whether they should have deviated from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as a model following the 1983 amendment. This
phenomenon was epitomized by the unwillingness or reluctance to
promulgate state counterparts embodying the 1993 revision of Rule
11.112 The growing disuniformity between federal and state civil
procedures imposes expense and potentially wastes time in intrastate
practice because it requires attorneys and parties to learn about,
understand and comply with disparate federal and state mandates."
3
These ideas mean that the fifty jurisdictions' rule amendment
entities (which are similar to the federal revisers) should do the
following: (1) base civil procedures as much as possible on federal
strictures; (2) eschew additional, and eliminate or modify current,
state requirements that are inconsistent with federal ones; and (3) at
least adopt Federal Rule 1 's 1993 amendment, which seemed to
treat the 1983 version's worst features, namely chilling effects and
satellite litigation. 114 Insofar as trial courts in the fifty jurisdictions
apply local measures that depart from federal or state civil
procedures, the judges must similarly refrain from prescription of
new ones and should abolish or change existing techniques.
If rule revision entities and courts in the jurisdictions undertake
efforts to implement the recommendations afforded, they should
consult state institutions, which resemble the Federal Judicial Center
and the Administrative Office, when available, as well as the two
federal entities. The National Center for State Courts might
correspondingly furnish much assistance as a valuable repository of,
112. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2059 (1989);
Carl Tobias, A Civil Discovery Dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615 (2002). See generally Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering
Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS
L. REV. 595 (2002).
114. See supra notes 50-51, 54-55, 58-60 and accompanying text But see
Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After
the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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and clearinghouse for, empirical data on the fifty jurisdictions' civil
procedure systems.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was
the most controversial revision in the half-century history of the
federal rules. Counsel and litigants overused and abused the revision
and judges inconsistently effectuated it partly because the
amendment was grounded on minimal empirical data. The 1983
modification has undermined confidence in the national rule
amendment process. If the federal rule revisers and district courts, as
well as their state analogues, follow the suggestions offered, they
might restore confidence in, and improve, the process.
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